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ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY AND THE ENERGY TRANSITION
John D. Sterman
ABSTRACT
The United States is currently undergoing a transition from rapidly depleting
nonrenewable energy sources to "backstop" energy sources. Unlike previous
transitions, the current transition will be marked by rising real energy
prices and may profoundly affect the economy. Despite the acknowledged
urgency of the problem, there is little agreement on the nature of the
connections between energy and the macroeconomy.
A system dynamics model is developed to analyze the macroeconomic effects of
the energy transition. GNP, consumption, investment, wages and prices, and
.other major energy and economic aggregates are determined endogenously.
Though the model generates macroeconomic dynamics, it is based on an
explicitly causal, behavioral theory of decisionmaking at the microeconomic
level of individuals and firms.
The model shows how delays in substitution and the development of new energy
sources arise and lead to substantial economic vulnerability during the next
several decades.
The model is used to analyze the effects of government subsidies for energy
technologies. The effects of subsidies for long-lead time, capital intensive
centralized technologies are contrasted against subsidies of short lead-time,
labor intensive, decentralized technologies; the latter are found to be far
more effective in reducing the vulnerability of the economy during the
transition.
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ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY AND THE ENERGY TRANSITION [1]
1. Energy and the Economy
The 1970s may well be remembered as a turning point in the economic
history of the United States. In 1970, domestic production of petroleum
peaked. Two years later, production of natural gas peaked 2]. Less than two
years later, the economic and strategic vulnerability of the United States was
forcefully demonstrated by OPEC, leading to the call for energy independence.
The rest of the decade brought a succession of disappointments and lowered
expectations. Both oil and gas output declined steadily. Coal was again
hailed as king but failed to ascend the throne. Nuclear power generated a
critical mass of safety, environmental, and ethical opposition which has
brought its development to a virtual standstill. As the nation enters the
last decades of the twentieth century, oil imports remain at dangerously high
levels, and alternative energy sources remain largely untapped. The nation
has been thrust into a major energy transition. Unlike the previous
transitions from wood to coal and from coal to oil, the current transition
will be marked by rising real energy prices. Never again will the nation
enjoy energy as abundant, inexpensive, and environmentally benign. [3]
Since 1973 there has been growing awareness that the energy
transition will be more difficult, time consuming, and expensive than
anticipated. There are already many signs of economic stress. During the
1970s, economic growth faltered from the 3.7%/year rate of the 1950s and 1960s
to 2.7%/year. The nation experienced the two deepest recessions since the
Great Depression, high unemployment, large trade deficits, slackened
productivity growth, and the most severe peacetime inflation in U.S. history.
While not all the nation's economic woes can be traced to energy, the impact
of energy on the economic health of the nation is undeniable. The
unemployment, factory shutdowns, hardship, and inconvenience caused by the
OPEC embargo of 1973, natural gas shortages of 1976, coal strike of 1978, and
gasoline shortages of 1979 all demonstrated the vulnerability of a modern
industrial economy to disruptions in energy price and availability. But
energy also creates vulnerability in more subtle ways: energy prices outpaced
inflation for most of the decade, raising the real price of energy and adding
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to inflationary pressures; growing capital requirements for energy production
threaten investment in other sectors of the economy; the costs of producing
synthetic fuels and other alternative sources rise as OPEC prices rise; and
high OPEC prices transfer income and wealth from oil consuming nations to oil
producing nations.
Despite the signs of stress and the acknowledged urgency of the
problem there is little agreement on the nature and relative importance of the
myriad interconnections between energy and the economy. A framework is needed
to integrate in a consistent and realistic manner the dynamic effects of
energy depletion and rising energy costs on economic growth, inflation, and
the standard of living.
This paper describes such a framework and its application to energy
policy analysis. The framework consists of a system dynamics model of the
national economy. Based on an explicitly causal theory of economic behavior
at the level of individuals and firms, the model endogenously generates the
major energy and economic aggregates including GNP, consumption, investment,
real and nominal wages and prices, the rate of inflation, interest rates, and
energy production, imports and prices. Because of the model's detailed
behavioral representation of the physical and decision-making structure of the
various sectors of the economy, policy initiatives such as price controls, tax
credits, and subsidies for energy production can be tested realistically in a
macroeconomic context.
Understanding of the dynamics of energy-economy interactions is just
developing. The analysis presented below focuses on the underlying structural
causes of the macroeconomic effects of energy policies over the long term.
The purpose is not to forecast energy use or the rate of economic growth, nor
is it to predict that there will or won't be an energy-induced depression in
the next decade. Such predictions are not useful and may be impossible in
principle. [4] The record of the past decade amply demonstrates the practical
impossibility of predicting energy use, production, or prices. It has been
well said that "if you jump out of an airplane, you are better off with a
parachute than an altimeter." [5] It is the purpose of this study to aid in
the design of the parachute.
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2. Some Difficulties in Energy-Economy Analysis
The energy crisis was initially perceived as a supply problem:
domestic production was dropping; imports were rising. Thus the first
generation of energy models were designed to explore ways to increase
production to meet projected demands while keeping energy prices relatively
low, and assuming historical rates of economic growth. [6] Though the extent
to which market interactions between supply and demand are included in such
models varies, nearly all the early energy models treated the energy sector in
isolation from the rest of the economy, including the assumptions that GNP,
interest rates, inflation, capital availability, backstop energy costs, and
OPEC prices are all unaffected by the availability and price of domestic
energy. The supply models generally showed that to satisfy projected energy
demands and reduce imports, the energy sector would require massive amounts of
capital, financed by large increases in the real price of energy. [7] Yet the
resulting high energy prices and drain of investment from other sectors of the
economy are inconsistent with the original input assumptions of moderate
increases in energy costs and vigorous economic growth. As a result, the
supply models were far too optimistic, causing their builders to lower
estimates of future economic growth and raise estimates of future energy
prices. Failure to incorporate the feedbacks between the energy sector and
the macroeconomy compromised the results of the the supply models.
A second generation of energy models was developed to deal with the
interactions between energy and the economy. [8] The energy-economy models
suggest the economy can accommodate itself to higher energy prices without
severe reductions in the standard of living. However, these models often
ignored the adjustment path of the economy to higher energy prices, assuming
instantaneous adjustment to the long run equilibrium, such as the assumption
that the energy required to utilize existing capital responds instantaneously
to an increase in prices. [9] Other models assume perfect information about
future energy demand, supply, and prices is available to decision makers. [10]
Because these models lack a behavioral theory of economic decisionmaking and
fail to account for the physical lags in the economy they provide no comfort
in assessing the prospects for the transition period, and little aid in
evaluating the likely response of the economy to policies. Mork and Hall
summarize the problem:
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...a successful analysis of an energy price shock [and more gener-
ally, depletion] must integrate two equally important aspects. On
the one hand, the long-term effects of energy substitution must be
incorporated. This is done in most general equilibrium energy-
economy models, but these are long-term growth models and [are] not
intended for analysis of short-term problems. All the existing large
short-run macroeconomic models lack this feature to our knowledge.
On the other hand, the short-run effects on price level, finan-
cial markets, and employment must be taken into account. As equilib-
rium models of the real economy, the energy-economy growth models
naturally abstract from these phenomena. Short-term macroeconomic
models include them, or can be modified to include them. However, a
fully satisfactory treatment of the problem requires an integration
of the long- and short-run mechanisms. [11 ]
To address questions of economic vulnerability during the energy
transition and to assess energy policies, the model descibed below represents
the physical and technical relationships in the economy and the decisionmaking
processes used by the actors in the system at the detailed, micro-level of
individuals and firms. Both the physical structure of the economy (the stock
and flow networks of people, goods, energy, and money) and the decision-making
structure of the various actors in the system (the decision rules and the
information sources for decisions) are represented.
By modeling the decision-making of the actors in the system and the
delays, constraints, and inadequate information that often confound them, the
macro-level dynamics of the economy emerge naturally out of the interaction of
the components of the system. Because such models provide a rich behavioral
description of the economy firmly rooted in managerial practice, they are
particularly well suited for examining the dynamic effects of policy
initiatives. [12]
In addition to a detailed behavioral representation of economic
decisionmaking, the model incorporates a wider boundary than found in many
other energy models (Table 1). A wide boundary is necessary to ensure the
feedback mechanisms that may delay or dilute the intent of a policy are
adequately represented.
The endogenous variables include the major economic and energy
aggregates. The model also endogenously generates a wide variety of variables
on the sectoral level such as output, employment, wages, investment, prices,
return on investment, liquidity, debt, and dividends. The exogenous variables
represent variables unlikely to be influenced strongly by the evolution of the
III
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Table 1: Summary of Model Boundary
ENDOGENOUS
GNP
Consumption
Investment
Savings
Prices (Real
and Nominal)
Wages (Real
and Nominal)
Inflation Rate
Labor Force
Participation
Employment
Unemployment
Interest Rates
Money Supply
Debt
Energy Production
Energy Demand
Energy Imports
EXOGENOUS
Population
Technological
Change
Tax Rates
Energy Policies
EXCLUDED
Inventories
International
Trade (except
with OPEC)
Environmental
Constraints
Non-energy
Resources
Interfuel
Substitution
Distributional
Equity
energy-economy system (such as population); variables representing specific
policy levers the model user wishes to test (such as energy policies and tax
rates); and variables such as technological progress and OPEC actions whose
coupling to the economy may be important but for which development of an
endogenous theory is too large a task given the model purpose.
The concepts and issues excluded from consideration are of particular
interest since they define the boundary of the model, delimit the issues for
which it can be legitimately used, and suggest likely avenues for further
research.
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Inventories: Energy depletion and the subsequent adjustment of the
economy is a process requiring decades. In comparison, adjustments to
inventories of goods and energy are short-term phenomena and can thus be
ignored without compromising the conclusions of the study. As a result,
the model does not deal with the short-term business cycle. [13]
International trade is excluded except for energy imports from OPEC and
the recycling of import revenues. Though non-energy trade is influenced
by.energy prices and availability, the purpose of the model does not
require an evaluation of the effects of energy imports on the exchange
rate or competitiveness of U.S. manufactured goods in the world market.
Environmental constraints (such as clean air standards) and possible
scarcity of non-energy resources (such as water for synfuel development)
are quite important. The direct economic costs of environmental con-
straints can be partially captured in the model by including the costs of
meeting environmental standards in estimates of the capital, energy, and
labor requirements of the various sectors of the model. But interactions
between the production of energy and the environment (such as aquifer
depletion or acid rain) and the potential long-term effects of pollution
(such as carbon dioxide buildup) cannot be assessed.
Interfuel substitution: To gauge the broad impact of depletion on the
economy it is not necessary to represent different fuel types or to
distinguish between oil, gas, oil shale, underground and surface coal,
nuclear power, etc. Such disaggregation would be required to address,
for example, possible liquid fuel constraints, the environmental impacts
of direct coal combustion versus liquefaction and gasification, or the
consequences of further electrification, issues that, while important,
lie outside the scope of the present study.
Distributional equity: The energy transition could have important effects
on the distribution of income among different social groups. Certain
sectors of the economy will suffeir; some energy-intensive industries may
vanish while new industries will surely appear. There may be important
geographical shifts in economic activity. These issues are all outside
the scope of the study and cannot be addressed with the current model.
3. Model Structure
The model represents the national economy and energy system,
including OPEC. There are five major sectors (Figure 1): production,
household, financial, government, and OPEC. The production sector actually
consists of four distinct production sectors: the goods sector, producing
consumer goods and services; the capital sector, producing capital plant and
equipment and housing; and the nonrenewable and backstop energy sectors,
corresponding respectively to nonrenewable energy sources and alternative
sources.
III
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Figure 1: Overview of Model Structure
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The household sector supplies labor to the production sectors and
receives wages and profits as income. The household spends most of its income
on goods, housing, and energy and saves the rest for investment in the
production sectors. The financial sector sets interest rates and allocates
available savings among competing demands for credit. The government sector
interacts with the financial sector through monetary policy and is also
responsible for collecting and disbursing taxes and conducting fiscal and
energy policy. Finally, the OPEC sector supplies energy to the domestic
economy, recycling its revenues by purchasing goods from the production
sectors and investing in the assets of the domestic economy.
The production and household sectors form the heart of the model;
Table 2 summarizes their definitions and relates them to the major industry
groupings of the National Income Accounts; Figure 2 shows the physical flows
of goods, capital, and energy between the production, household, and OPEC
sectors.
The goods sector supplies goods and services to both households and
OPEC. The capital sector supplies plant and equipment to all the sectors
including the OPEC sector, the household sector (where capital represents
housing), and to itself. Similarly, the energy sector (nonrenewable and
backstop energy taken together) delivers energy to all the sectors except
OPEC. Corresponding to the network of physical flows shown in Figure 2 are
analogous but distinct networks of orders and payments.
The treatment of energy merits special attention. Energy is
represented in terms of BTUs of heat value. [14] Energy production has been
divided into the three broad categories of nonrenewable energy, backstop
energy, and imports. The nonrenewable energy sector is dependent on a
resource base which is gradually depleted. As depletion occurs, the marginal
cost of discoveries rises. In contrast, the backstop energy sector represents
both renewable energy sources (such as solar, biomass, and small-scale
hydropower) and nonrenewable sources which draw on very large resource bases
(such as shale oil, coal synthetics, and nuclear power). [15] Depletion of
these sources is not likely to be significant within the time horizon of the
study. The backstop sector can be calibrated to represent different
alternative technologies by varying its cost structure and the input mix of
capital, labor, and energy. But whereas the quantity of capital, labor, and
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Table 2: Sectoral Definitions
Definition Major Industry Groups
Produces consumer goods
and services, including
government services
Produces capital plant
and equipment and housing,
includes non-energy raw
materials
Agriculture, consumer durables
consumer nondurables, services,
transportation, government ser-
vices, including military
Contract construction, metal
mining, non-fuel nonmetallic
mining, machinery, stone, clay,
and glass products
Nonrenewable
energy
Backstop
Energy
Produces nonrenewable
energy
Produces alternative
energy sources. Corre-
sponds to "backstop"
energy sources
Petroleum, natural gas, con-
ventional coal (coal not used for
synfuels)
Shale oil, coal synthetics, nuclear
power, solar energy, all energy
sources not considered conven-
tional sources.
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energy required to produce nonrenewable energy rises as more of the resource
is extracted, the amount of capital, labor, and energy required to produce
backstop sources remains the same. (However, as in each production sector,
the actual factor mix can change in response to varying relative prices and
the availability of the factors of production.)
The concept of the backstop is a useful but considerable
simplification of reality. Many of the energy sources commonly cited as
"backstops" are in fact nonrenewable sources such as oil shale, coal
synthetics, and nuclear. And few if any of the alternative sources are so
abundant and evenly distributed that they can boast a flat supply curve: even
solar energy will grow more expensive on the margin as south-facing slopes and
the regions with the highest insolation are developed.
The assumptions made in the model about backstop energy are likely to
underestimate the costs of producing backstop energy and overestimate its
availability. To paraphrase Solow, the technologies trying out for backstop
may be catchers who allow some passed balls. [16] Since the purpose of the
model is to demonstrate the importance of the macroeconomic effects of the
energy transition in designing energy policy, the model's optimistic repre-
sentation of alternative energy sources is appropriate: if the model
demonstrates the potential for significant macroeconomic effects even when
backstop energy is assumed to have such optimistic properties, a more
disaggregate and realistic treatment of the backstop technologies that
included depletion, supply curve effects, and environmental constraints would
produce effects at least as large.
The determination of energy demand is a crucial part of the model
structure and is presented below as an example of the level of detail
represented in the model. The energy each sector requires to operate is tied
to the sector's capital stock. A firm may have a wide menu of efficiencies to
choose from when deciding on the specifications of new investment, but once
that investment is made, the energy required to operate the capital is largely
fixed. Many models account for the rigidity in energy requirements by
employing a putty-clay approach in which there is complete flexibility of
factor proportions ex ante investment and complete rigidity ex post. However,
the assumption that energy requirements are fixed ex post investment makes no
allowance for "additional home and plant insulation, automobile tuneups, and
12
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retrofitting of certain industrial processes to utilize waste heat." [17]
Many studies favor retrofits and conservation as the cheapest 'source' of
energy. [18] To examine the crucial issue of retrofits, the model employs a
variant of the putty-clay approach which both binds the energy requirements of
each sector to its capital stock and explicitly includes retrofits (Figure 3).
The model keeps track of the energy required to operate each unit of
capital begining with the construction of new units. When construction is
completed, the sector's capital stock is increased; the energy requirements of
the capital stock are increased in proportion to the energy intensity of the
new units. As the capital ages (three vintages of capital are represented)
and is ultimately discarded, the energy re: prements of the sector are dimin-
ished by the energy intensity of the discarded units. The decision to under-
take retrofits is based on principles of economic optimization: firms compare
the (perceived) marginal revenue product of additional energy use to the
marginal cost of energy and adjust the desired energy intensity accordingly.
[19] If energy prices rise, firms will undertake to reduce the energy
intensity of new investment and the energy intensity of existing capital (in
accordance with the long-run substitution possibilities). However, the
ability to bring existing capital up to the efficiency of new units is
constrained by the physical characteristics of the existing units (represented
in the model by the original energy requirements of capital). For example,
the optimal amount of insulation in a house might be eight inches, but if the
walls are four inches thick, a retrofit, though still potentially worthwhile,
can not bring the house up to the optimal efficiency. The model allows the
degree to which the original characteristics of capital constrain retrofits to
be varied by specifying the retrofit potential. If existing capital so
constrains the possibilities that no retrofits are economically feasible, the
retrofit potential is zero, as in a putty-clay model; if no constraint exists,
the retrofit potential is 100%, a putty-putty situation. Thus the model
allows any degree of ex post flexibility to be represented.
Parameters and initial conditions were estimated with numerical data
where available such as the time series available in the National Income
Accounts, Historical Statistics, and other government sources. In addition,
econometric estimation reported in other studies and qualitative information
reported in the economics, management, and engineering literature have been
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used where numerical data are insufficient. [20] Yet because the model
structure is behavioral and causal rather than statistical and correlative,
numerical data were unavailable to estimate many parameters. Faced with a
number of relationships and parameters with uncertain values, sensitivity
analysis is crucial. It is useful to define three types of sensitivity:
numerical, behavioral, and policy sensitivity. [21] A model is numerically
sensitive when a change in parameters causes a change in the numerical values
of the output. All mathematical models are numerically sensitive. A model is
behaviorally sensitive when a change in parameters causes a change in the
dynamic pattern of behavior, for example, a change from oscillation to
stability or from growth to collapse. Finally, a model is policy sensitive
when a change in assumptions changes the characteristic response of the system
to policy interventions. For example, an energy excise tax would be policy
sensitive if the system exhibited a strong trade-off between the short- and
long-run effects of the policy under one set of assumptions but not under some
other set of conditions.
The type of sensitivity that is relevant and hence the role of data
in any application depends on the purpose of the model. To pose questions
about possible amplification of the effects of depletion and the potential for
delays to worsen the intermediate-term impact of depletion is to ask about
behavioral tendencies of the system. To address the macroeconomic consequen-
ces of policy interventions is to ask about policy effectiveness. Thus behav-
ioral and policy sensitivity are the relevant measures of model sensitivity.
System dynamics models and, more generally, feedback control models
typically exhibit insensitivity of behavior modes and policy responses to
changes in the vast majority of parameters and relationships. [22] If the
characteristic modes of behavior and response to policies are insensitive to
variations that span the range of uncertainty in a given relationship, then
there is no need for great precision in the estimation of that relationship.
Time and resources are best spent elsewhere. Indeed, one of the purposes of
model building is to identify those few relationships that are sensitive to
guide further research and policy design. Sensitivity analysis of the model
showed the modes of behavior and policy responses described below to be
invariant with respect to changes in major assumptions. [23]
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4. Base Case Assumptions and Historical Comparison
The major assumptions of the base case appear in Table 3. The
assumptions represent a fortiori estimates: where uncertainty exists, the
choice errs on the optimistic side. [24]
Table 3: Base Case Assumptions
1950 Nonrenewable
Resource/Production Ratio 146 years
Initial Backstop Price $40/bbl (1980$)
Elasticity of Substitution
between Capital and Energy .75
Retrofit Potential 25%
OPEC Pricing Policy Constant Real Price to 1983,
then adjustment over
1983-1995 to Backstop Price
Energy Price Regulation Phased Decontrol 1973-1985
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Non-interventionist
Domestic energy prices are assumed to be regulated between 1950 and
1973. Under regulation, prices are based on historical costs and "normal"
profit and do not respond to supply and demand pressures. Starting in 1973,
domestic energy prices are gradually deregulated and allowed to move to a
market-determined level based on marginal costs and market forces.
Deregulation is assumed complete by 1985, the current target for final
decontrol of natural gas. By the end of 1980, deregulation is two-thirds
complete.
Monetary and fiscal policy is assumed to be non-interventionist. The
government is not allowed to run a deficit and growth in the money supply is
indexed to growth in real GNP. As a result, the model does not reproduce the
inflation of the 1970s.
16
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The model is started in 1950 providing three decades of simulated
historical experience. [25] Comparison of simulated and actual behavior
establishes the model's ability to capture trends and turning points in
important quantities. Because the historical data were not directly used to
estimate the model, the simulated behavior is analyzed as if it were a
forecast outside the period of fit. In particular, the root-mean-square-
percent error and Theil inequality statistics are used to quantify the
magnitude and nature of the errors. The Theil statistics decompose the root-
mean-square error into three components which measure the fraction of the
error due to (1) bias, (2) unequal variation in the simulated and actual
series, and (3) unequal covariation in the two series. [26] Of the eleven
variables examined (Table 4) only real energy price, energy imports, and real
investment exceed 10% root mean square percent error; five are under 5%.
Error decomposition shows that except for real energy price, the bias or
systematic component of error is 2.5% RMSPE or less. Except for net energy
consumption, the unequal variation term is 2.0% RMSPE or less. The systematic
errors in energy price, investment, and net energy consumption are readily
explained by simplifying assumptions. [27] In interpreting the statistical
results, it must be remembered that only three exogenous time series are used:
population, technology, and the OPEC price. The ability of the model to
capture trends and turning points is therefore primarily due to the endogenous
interaction of model elements.
5. Base Case Results: Economic Vulnerability
The past decade has forcefully demonstrated the dangers to both
economic stability and national security of heavy reliance on imported energy.
Vulnerability, however, is not measured by imports alone. Important
indicators of economic vulnerability, all endogenously generated by the model,
include:
1. The fraction of total energy supplies imported
2. The real price of energy
3. The fraction of economic output devoted to energy production
4. OPEC revenues and ownership of U.S. assets
5. The duration of the energy transition
6. Reductions in economic growth' due to energy.
17
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Table 4: Summary of Historical Behavior of Model
Theil Inequality Statistics*
RMS Percent Unequal Unequal
Variable Error (%) Bias Variation Covariation
Real GNP 3.2
Real
Consumption 4.7
0.3 (10%)
2.5 (54%)
o (0%)
1.4 (29%)
2.9 (90%)
0.8 (17%)
Consumption
·Fraction** 0.04 (1%)
Real Private
Investment
Real Wage
Workforce
Participation
Fraction
11.7
5.4
2.5
0.2 (2%)
0.5 (10%)
1.9 (75%)
1.2 (10%)
1.3 (23%)
0.4 (17%)
10.3 (88%)
3.6 (67%)
0.2 (8%)
Total Energy
Consumption
Total Energy
Production
Energy Import
Fraction***
7.6
13.9
1.1 (15%)
1.7 (12%)
2.0 (26%)
. 1 (0.6%)
4.5 (59%)
12.1 (87%)
Real Energy
Price
Net Energy
Consumption
14.0
9.7
8.1 (58%)
1.6 (16%)
* Totals may not add due to rounding.
** Real consumption/Real GNP
*** Computed from 1960 to 1977
3.6 1.7 (46%) 1.9 (53%)
4.0 0.2 (4%) 0.2 (4%) 3.7 (92%)
0.0 (0%)
6.0 (62%)
5.9 (42%)
2.1 (22%)
III
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The fraction of total energy supplies imported directly measures the
vulnerability of the economy to sudden price hikes and interruptions in the
flow of imports. The duration and magnitude of import dependency defines the
"window of vulnerability" facing the nation. Energy production and
consumption in the base case appear in Figure 4. Growth in energy consumption
slows rapidly after 1980. Consumption rises only 4 quads per year between
1980 and 1990, remains virtually constant at about 84 quads per year until
2000 and then drops to 64 quads per year in 2015 before recovering. Energy
consumption grows 4.8 times from 1950 to 2050 while GNP grows 10.6 times. As
a result of deregulation, nonrenewable energy production, after stagnating
during the 1970s, grows rapidly through the 1980s. The resurgence of
nonrenewable production and the near-constant demand for energy combine to
reduce imports dramatically from a peak of 21% of total consumption to just
3%. Continued depletion causes nonrenewable production to decline after 1995
as investment in energy shifts to backstop sources. Backstop production is
slow to develop, however, and fails to pick up the slack left by depletion:
despite average annual growth of over 10% per year between 1990 and 2020,
backstop energy supplies just 4.6% of consumption in 2000 and 48% in 2020 even
though total energy consumption drops during the period. As a result, imports
grow rapidly to a second peak of 26% and remain above 10% until 2035.
The real price of energy (Figure 5) overshoots the initial price of
backstop energy by more than 100%, reaching a peak of $85 per barrel (1980
dollars) in 2010. The overshoot begins around 1995, and the average price
remains at least 20% above the initial backstop price until 2030.
The sharp increase in energy prices induces massive conservation and
substitution. The energy/GNP ratio falls over 50% between 1980 and 2050, a
reflection of the high substitution potential assumed in the base case.
During the period of highest energy prices, the ratio falls by over 60%.
However, the improvement in efficiency takes time: energy prices reach and
then exceed their long-run level by 1997, yet the energy/GNP ratio in 1997 has
fallen only one-third of the way to its final value. The delay in the
adjustment of energy demand to prices implies the share of GNP and consumption
devoted to energy will overshoot its final equilibrium during the adjustment
period, magnifying the economic impact of the price overshoot.
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The sources of the overshoot in real energy prices are shown in
Figure 6. Before 1973, both OPEC and nonrenewable energy prices are stable
and roughly equal. Backstop energy is not being produced but would sell at
$40 per barrel (1980 dollars), the assumed initial price. After 1973, the
average energy price begins to rise with depletion, deregulation, and the
sharp increase in OPEC prices. Nonrenewable energy prices rise rapidly after
1985.
Most striking, however, is the large increase in backstop energy
price beginning around 1973. Backstop energy, though not subject to
depletion, escalates in price to a peak over $90 per barrel in 2005. OPEC
prices rise to the backstop price between 1982 and 1995 as OPEC adjusts its
price to their perception of the price of alternatives. The escalation in
backstop prices delays investment in backstop technologies, forcing continued
reliance on nonrenewable energy: nonrenewable energy remains less expensive
than backstop sources until after 2010. Had the backstop price remained
constant, the crossover would have occurred around 1997. The escalations thus
directly delay the transition by 15 years. In addition to the overshoot of
backstop prices, the average price of energy overshoots the backstop price
itself. The long construction delays for backstop force reliance on
nonrenewable energy even after it becomes more expensive.
The overshoot of real energy price adds to vulnerability in several
ways. First, OPEC's ability to raise oil prices depends on the cost and
availability of alternative supplies. The greater the overshoot of domestic
energy prices, the greater OPEC's leverage over world prices. Second, the
overshoot in real energy price indicates the relative inflexibility of both
energy demand and supply in the intermediate-term adjustment period. A large
price overshoot therefore indicates long delays and great inflexibility in the
development of both alternative supplies of energy and energy-efficient
industrial and residential infrastructure.
The fraction of the gross output of the economy devoted to energy
production measures the degree to which the productive resources of the
economy must be diverted from capital formation (hence reducing economic
growth) and from production of goods and services (hence reducing consumption
and government activities). Historically quite low, the fraction of economic
output devoted to energy (Figure 7) rises to a peak more than six times the
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1970 value and more than 50% of the final value. The relative expansion of
the energy sector indicates proportionate contractions in the goods, capital,
and government sectors of the economy. The large overshoot in the relative
size of the energy sector, due to the overshoot of real energy prices and slow
adjustment of energy efficiencies, indicates the greatest stress on the
economy occurs during the transition years 1990 to 2015.
OPEC revenues and ownership of U.S. assets directly indicate
vulnerability. The flow of revenue to OPEC constitutes claims on the output
and assets of the U.S. economy, worsens the balance of trade, places downward
pressure on the dollar, and indicates the political leverage OPEC can exert
over corporate and national policy. [28] Real OPEC revenues (Figure 8) show
the historical period of rapid growth during the 1970s, followed by a decline
as imports fall with higher prices during the 1980s. OPEC's revenues rise
again to a peak of over $300 billion per year (1980 dollars) after declining
nonrenewable energy production and slow development of backstop sources
combine to restore massive dependence on high priced imports.
Reductions in economic growth (and attendant unemployment) increase
the vulnerability of the economy both domestically and in international
markets. Figure 9 shows simulated real GNP in the base case compared to a
simulation in which no depletion occurs. When no depletion occurs, real
energy prices remain constant at the initial level. In both runs there is
substantial economic growth, due to assumed population growth and technical
progress. Consistent with the results of equilibrium energy-economy models,
depletion has little long-run effect on GNP: after 2030 the two paths are
virtually identical. During the transition period from 1980 to 2030, however,
GNP is noticeably reduced by depletion. The reduction is greatest between
1984 and 1994, a ten-year period of no growth. GNP in 1990 is 14% below the
no-depletion case. At a 5% real discount rate, the present value of lost GNP
after 1980 is $4.2 trillion or over 9% of the present value of real GNP betwen
1980 and 2050.
The strong intermediate-term impact of depletion on economic
performance is reinforced by real consumption per capita, which falls 7%
between 1985 and 1990; in 1995, per capita consumption is still 2.2% lower
than the 1980 level. Household expenditures on energy more than double
between 1970 and 1995, further reducing non-energy purchases of housing,
23
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c. The economic stresses caused by depletion further slow the
adjustment of energy use to optimal levels by reducing the
resources available to finance retrofits and investment in
efficient capital and housing.
3. Real energy prices overshoot their long-run level, primarily due to
escalation in the price of backstop sources. The escalation delays
the development of backstop sources, increasing import dependence
a. Long construction delays and financial stress lead to a shortage
of capital in the backstop sector. To speed construction and
boost output, more labor is employed, but at sharply diminishing
returns. Costs rise as the industry moves up its short-run
supply curve.
b. The backstop sector's labor requirements expand faster than the
workforce, forcing wages in the sector above the national
average.
c. The credit-worthiness of the backstop industry declines because
long lead times and rising input costs lead to low liquidity.
lenders impose an additional risk premium and reduce the
availability of external financing.
d. As energy prices rise, so do backstop construction and production
costs. Backstop energy technologies are energy-intensive. The
greater the energy intensity, the lower the net energy yield of
the technology and the greater the escalation of energy prices.
e. Backstop energy industry production capacity (constrained by long
construction periods and low liquidity) lags orders, and market
pressures force backstop prices above costs.
6. Policy Analysis
The model can be used to test a broad range of policies including
investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation for backstop energy
sources, subsidies and price supports for energy development, and accelerated
conservation and retrofits of existing capital stocks. The policies analyzed
below focus on the effects of subsidies for different types of alternative
energy technologies.
Subsidies for development of backstop energy technologies have been
an important component of energy policy to date. The federal government has
supported research and development, funded demonstration projects, and most
recently, authorized the expenditure of up to $88 billion for synthetic fuels
through the U.S. Synfuels Corporation. The rationale for such subsidies is to
speed the energy transition by bringing backstop energy sources on line more
26
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goods, and services. Unemployment is increased by depletion during the
transition years by a maximum of eight percentage points over the base case.
Analysis of the base case behavior reveals three fundamental sources
of the large intermediate term economic effects of depletion. The major
structural causes of the economic impacts, listed below, were identified
through sensitivity tests. For example, the role of the long lifetime of
energy consuming capital (2a below) was tested by varying the potential for
retrofits. Increasing the retrofit potential from 25% to 75%, implying
existing capital can be brought 75% of the way from its original efficiency to
the efficiency of new plant, equipment, and housing, reduced the peak real
energy price by 15% and peak real OPEC revenues by nearly one third, indicat-
ing the importance of the delays in replacing old capital with efficient
capital. (However, the real energy price, OPEC revenues, and the other
indicators of vulnerability still exhibited the modes of behavior of the base
case.)
1. Despite a transient increase caused by deregulation, depletion
continues to reduce nonrenewable energy production and raise its
cost.
a. Deregulation increases exploration and production in the near
term, but as a direct consequence, depletion of remaining
nonrenewable resources is accelerated, reducing production more
rapidly in the long term.
b. Depletion raises the energy required for discovery and
development of nonrenewable resources, reducing the net energy
yield of exploration and creating a powerful vicious cycle of
higher exploration costs, energy price increases, and higher
exploration costs. The "multiplier effect" substantially boosts
energy prices above the level required by depletion alone.
2. Energy demand adjusts slowly to rising prices, raising expenditures
on energy above their long-run equilibrium value during the
transition. More capital and labor are diverted to the energy sector
in the intermediate-term than in the long-term, reducing the
resources available for consumption and growth.
a. The long life of housing and industrial plant and equipment cause
average efficiencies to lag the efficiency of new investment by
ten to thirty years.
b. Delays in perceiving and reacting to changes in the optimal
energy intensity of capital further slow the adjustment of energy
use to rising prices.
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quickly. Developing new energy technologies places extreme cash flow pressure
on the firms involved. Subsidies, it is hoped, will establish alternative
energy sources on a firm footing, thus allowing the industry as a whole to
become self-supporting more rapidly.
Subsidy advocates generally favor particular backstop energy sources
over others and see subsidies as a means to foster a particular mix of
technologies. To date, subsidies have been heavily focused on "conventional"
backstop technologies such as nuclear power, breeder reactors, and synthetic
fuels from coal, shale, and tar sands. However, the market may not favor the
same ensemble of technologies as the subsidy. Thus there are basic economic
questions concerning whether or not subsidies are justified and which types of
backstop technologies ought to be subsidized. To test the impact of
subsidies, the following assumptions are made:
1. The government provides an unrestricted subsidy to the
backstop energy sector, starting in 1982.
2. The subsidy desired by the backstop sector is based on the
cash-flow reqirements of the sector.
3. The subsidy is financed through proportional reductions in
other government activities.
4. Conventional backstop technologies are emphasized.
An unrestricted subsidy based on the cash-flow needs of the backstop sector
implies the government provides whatever funds the backstop sector requires
but is unable to raise itself through retained earnings or in the capital
markets. Financing the subsidy through reductions of other government
activities does not alter the total tax burden or government budget, but
directs spending away from social and military services.
The emphasis on conventional backstop technologies is crucial.
Conventional backstop sources are characterized by long lead times, high
capital, energy, and materials requirements, reliance on a specialized labor
force, and often, as for example in the case of oil shale, are geographically
concentrated in remote areas. [29]
The effects of the subsidy on the indicators of vulnerability are
contrasted to a simulation of the conventional backstop technology without
subsidies in Table 5. The subsidy reduces the magnitude of vulnerability: the
27
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peak import level is reduced nearly one third, and with it OPEC revenues; real
energy prices peak at $68/barrel rather than $90/barrel, a reduction in the
price overshoot of nearly one-half; market penetration of the backstop
technologies is accelerated' by eleven years; and economic growth during the
transition is improved. The total cost of the subsidy between 1982 and 2020
is $588 billion, or an average of over $15 billion per year (in 1980 dollars).
Table 5: Vulnerability Under Conventional and
Unconventional Backstop Technologies
Test 1: Test 2: Test 3: Test 4:
Conventional Conventional Unconventional Unconventional
Backstop Backstop with Backstop Backstop with
Indicator No Subsidy Subsidy No Subsidy Subsidy
Peak Fraction of 27.4% 18.6% 14.5% 7.8%
Energy Imported
Peak Fraction of 13.4% 12.7% 12.3% 12.9%
Output for Energy*
Peak Real OPEC 312 204 137 81
Revenues
(Billion 1980
$/year)
Peak Real Price 90 68 63 54
of Energy
(1 980 $/barrel)
Duration of Energy 2034 2023 2024 2020
Transition**
Present Value of 36.6 36.9 37.0 37.2
Real Consumption
(Trillion 1972 $)***
Accumulated Cost 0 588 0 485
of Subsidy in 2020
(Billion 1980 $)
* Payments for Energy/Total payments for factors of production.
** Year backstop sources first supply 75% of primary energy.
*** Present value of real consumption at 5%/year real discount rate.
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The subsidy reduces vulnerability and speeds the energy transition both
directly, by providing funds needed to construct backstop energy facilities;
and indirectly, by reducing the stress on the backstop industry that
constrains its development. By providing the financing the private capital
markets were initially unwilling to supply, the subsidy eases the liquidity
crunch that chronically afflicts the backstop industry (due to its long lead
times) and thus makes the industry more attractive to private lenders as well,
further easing the cash-flow problem. Reduced financial stress on the
backstop industry reduces the escalation of the backstop price, thus speeding
the penetration of backstop sources and slowing the depletion of the remaining
nonrenewable resources. Slower depletion of nonrenewable resources and
reduced escalation of backstop prices lead to the reduction in average energy
prices.
Though the subsidy reduces the vulnerability of the economy during
the energy transition, substantial vulnerability still remains: imports peak
at nearly one-fifth of total energy consumption, OPEC revenues peak over $200
billion per year, the real price of energy and fraction of gross output devot-
ed to energy production still overshoot their equilibrium values. Further,
the subsidy has no appreciable effect on either the fraction of energy import-
ed or the real price of energy until after 2000. The tenacity of vulnera-
bility despite better than a half-trillion-dollar subsidy is fundamentally due
to the long lead times, high capital and energy requirements, and centraliza-
tion of the conventional backstop sources emphasized by the policy. The long
lead times and remote locations of the conventional technologies mean the
investment and growth rate permitted by the subsidies are offset to some deg-
ree as more severe bottlenecks in capital and labor availability are created.
To examine the effects of the emphasis on long lead-time, capital-
intensive 'conventional' backstop technologies, a policy emphasizing 'unconv-
entional' backstop technologies was tested. Unconventional backstop technol-
ogies, compared to the conventional backstop technologies, are characterized
by shorter lead timest lower capital and energy requirements, relative geo-
graphic decentralization, and less reliance on highly specialized labor (Table
6).
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Table 6: Comparison of Conventional and Unconventional
Backstop Technologies
Conventional Unconventional
Average Lead Time 7 5
for Capital (years)
Capital/Labor 70/30 50/50
Ratio*
Energy Intensity** .15 .10
(BTU input/BTU output)
Normal Labor .05 .10
Mobility***
(fraction/year)
Initial Cost 40 40
(1980 $/barrel)
* Initial value share of capital/initial value share of labor.
** Initially. In both cases, energy input per BTU output can vary; the
elasticity of substitution is .75 in both cases.
*** Normal labor mobility into the backstop sector. Normal for other
sectors .10/year.
Relative to the conventional backstop technology, the unconventional
backstop embodies a lead time two years shorter, a relatively more labor-
intensive, less capital- and energy-intensive technology, and is both more
decentralized and less dependent on highly specialized labor, reflected in the
relative ease of labor mobility compared to the conventional backstop.
However, it must be emphasized that the unconventional backstop is not assumed
to be inexpensive: the unconventional backstop still requires an average
construction period of five years (longer than for nonrenewable energy
sources), and capital, labor, and energy intensities are significantly higher
than for the nonrenewable energy, goods, and capital sectors. Most important
the conventional and unconventional backstop technologies are assumed to have
the same initial cost. Thus any differences between the two configurations
arise only as a result of their differing technological and geographical
characteristics and are not due to assumed differences in costs.
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Emphasis on unconventional backstop technologies substantially
reduces vulnerability during the transition and speeds the transition as well
(Table 5, Test 3). Imports are reduced by nearly 50%, while OPEC revenues
fail by more than 50%. The overshoot of the real energy price (and hence the
OPEC price) drops from 125% of the long run price to 33%, even though the
initial backstop prices in both cases are the same. The penetration of
backstop sources of energy is accelerated by a decade compared to the
conventional backstop configuration. More striking, development of
unconventional backstop technologies with no government subsidies reduces
vulnerability substantially more than emphasis on conventional backstop
technologies even when subsidized.
Because the unconventional backstop is assumed to have a shorter lead
time, the penetration of backstop sources is directly enhanced. However, the
assumed lead time is but two years shorter than for the conventional backstop
technology, while actual market penetration is advanced fully ten years. The
strong synergy is largely due to the effect of the lead time on the financial
stress experienced by the backstop sector. Long lead times cause financial
problems that further delay development of backstop sources beyond the
physical construction period (see 3c above). Shorter lead times reduce the
working capital requirements of backstop projects, thus easing the chronic
cash-flow problem that afflicts the industry as it pays for construction
before facilities can come on line and generate revenues. With better cash
flow, the industry is able to expand more rapidly. Further, with the
improvement in liquidity comes a reduction in the perceived risk of backstop
projects, thus increasing the willingness of capital markets to invest and
reducing the risk premium on external financing. Increased availability of
less expensive financing further improves the cash-flow of the industry
allowing still more rapid development of backstop energy sources.
The reduced capital and energy requirements of the unconventional
backstop also contribute to the reduction in vulnerability in two ways.
First, reduced capital intensity and increased labor intensity speed
development of backstop sources because labor can be acquired more rapidly
than capital. Second, reduced energy and capital requirements buffer the
backstop sector from the reinforcing cycle of energy price increases,
increased costs of plant, equipment and energy inputs, and further increases
in prices (see 3d above).
__1___11_1_1_·111I 1..__.1_._1111___1__II_____.___.·.
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Finally, the assumed ease of attracting and training labor, a
reflection of the geographic decentralization and reduced specialization of
labor assumed for unconventional backstop technologies, speeds the development
of the backstop and lowers its cost by reducing the wage escalation needed to
attract the required labor force.
Thus despite the same initial cost, an energy strategy based on
unconventional backstop technologies can reduce real energy prices during the
transition, improving the performance of the economy more than heavy
subsidization of conventional backstop sources.
The reduction in vulnerability deriving from emphasis on
unconventional backstop technologies suggests a program of government
subsidies directed towards the unconventional technologies would be more
effective than subsidies of conventional backstop sources. To test this
hypothesis, the subsidy policy discussed above is repeated with the subsidies
directed towards unconventional backstop technologies. The assumed policy for
subsidizing the backstop sector is exactly the same. The results (Table 5,
Test 4) show the subsidy to be much more effective per dollar when applied to
development of unconventional backstop technologies. Imports are reduced by
nearly half from the unsubsidized unconventional backstop case, while
subsidies of conventional backstop technologies reduced the import fraction by
only one third. OPEC revenues, already low under the unconventional backstop
case, are reduced a further 41% by the subsidy compared to 35% when
conventional backstop technologies are subsidized. The overshoot in real
energy price is nearly eliminated, as prices peak just $14/barrel above the
initial backstop price compared to an overshoot twice as large when
conventional technologies are subsidized. Additionally, though the subsidy of
unconventional backstop technologies reduces vulnerability and improves
economic performance more than the identical subsidy policy aimed at
unconventional technologies, the accumulated cost by 2020 is only 82% as
great.
The subsidy is more effective per dollar because the unconventional
backstop technologies are less prone to the chronic cash-flow problems and
cost escalations that plague the conventional technologies, in which subsidies
can be self-defeating to some degree by worsening the capital and labor
bottlenecks that constrain their development.
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7. Conclusions
The economy is likely to face a prolonged period of economic
vulnerability due to the continued depletion of nonrenewable resources, slow
development of alternative sources, and lags in the adjustment of energy
consumption to higher prices. The magnitude and duration of the vulnerability
is strongly influenced, however, by the technological and institutional
charactersitics of alternative energy sources. If capital- and energy-
intensive, geographically centralized technologies with long lead times are
emphasized, the economic consequences are likely to be much more severe than
those attending the development of relatively labor-intensive, decentralized
technologies with shorter lead times, even if the technologies have the same
initial costs. Further, government subsidies are much more effective per
dollar when applied to the development of unconventional backstop energy
sources.
More important, perhaps, than the specific policy conclusions is the
demonstration that the feedbacks between energy and the economy and the delays
in the adjustment of the economy to the changes wrought by depletion are
crucial determinants of both economic behavior and the evolution of the energy
sector itself. Neither energy planning nor economic policy can be conducted
in isolation from the other, or without consideration of the disequilibrium
dynamics of the transition.
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NOTES
1. The work described in this paper was supported in part by the U.S.
Department of Energy and the California Energy Commission. A detailed
description of the model structure, assumptions, and results summarized
here may be found in Sterman 1981. The results presented here are the
sole responsibility of the author.
2. DOE/EIA 1978a, p. 3.
3. "The easy days of easy and cheap oil are truly over" (Stobaugh and
Yergin 1979, p. 13); "Higher energy costs cannot be avoided...[The]
environmental effects of energy use are serious and hard to manage."
(RFF 1979, p. 4). "...even in the face of increasing demand and higher
prices, the production from nonrenewable oil sources will probably
level out and peak during the period of 1990 to the year 2000..."
(CONAES/SUPPLY 1979, p. 26) The Global 2000 study (CEQ 1980) reached
similar conclusions for the world as a whole by examining the global
energy problem in the context of population growth, non-energy
resources, food, and the environment.
4. On the futility of point prediction, see Forrester 1961, Appendix K.
5. Attributed to Robert Allen by Daly 1977, p. 50.
6. See, e.g., DOE/EIA 1978b, Backus et al. 1979, Cazalet 1977, Carasso et
al. 1975, and FEA 1974.
7. DOE/EIA 1978b, DOE 1979.
8. E.g. Hudson and Jorgenson 1974, Hogan and Manne 1977, and Manne 1977.
See also DOE/EIA 1979 and Manne et al. 1979 for surveys of energy-
economy literature.
9. Hudson and Jorgenson 1974.
10. ETA-MACRO (Manne 1977) and PILOT (Parikh 1976) both assume perfect
foresight.
11. Mork and Hall 1979, p. 1.
12. For information on system dynamics, see Forrester 1961, Forrester
1968, Forrester 1980a, Goodman 1974, and Richardson and Pugh 1981.
Economic and energy applications include Mass 1975, Naill 1977, Senge
1978, Backus et al. 1979, and Choucri 1981; see also EPRI 1980.
13. For business cycles theories based on the interaction of inventory
management and employment policies see Mass 1975 and Low 1980. To the
extent inventory/employment dynamics amplify the effects of shocks such
as energy price increases, the model will tend to underestimate the
short-run effects of the energy transition.
34
D-3356
14. Aggregation by heat value implies the various end use fuels are
fungible, that is they can be freely substituted for one another. The
assumption of fungibility represents an a fortiori simplifying
assumption: to the extent actual substitution possibilities among end
use fuels are less than assumed, the model will underestimate the
likely economic impacts of rising energy prices.
15. The concept of the backstop was introduced by Nordhaus 1973. The
Nordhaus model is a linear programming model with perfect foresight and
instantaneous adoption of new technologies. A different perspective
can be found in Behrens 1973, who examines the problem of substitution
to a backstop in a dynamic framework.
16. Solow 1974, p. 4.
17. Griffin 1979, p. 30.
18. Stobaugh and Yergin 1979, Lovins 1977, Sant 1980.
19. The optimization of each sector's factor balance operates on hillclimb-
ing principles, but explicitly accounts for the perception delays in
forming expectations of marginal productivity and the physical delays
in redesigning and retooling existing products for higher energy
efficiencies.
20. For a discussion of the sources of information for and the role of data
in system dynamics models, see Forrester 1961, especially Ch. 4.7;
Forrester 1980b; and Forrester et al. 1975.
21. See Forrester and Senge 1980 and Richardson and Pugh 1981, section 5.2.
22. The behavior and policy insensitivity of system dynamics models is
demonstrated in Forrester 1969, especially Ch. 6 and Appendix B.3,
Schroeder 1975, Britting and Trump 1975, Naill 1977 Appendix A, and
Meadows et al. 1974. Mass 1974 and Schroeder et al. 1975 include many
papers describing the behavior and policy insensitivity of an urban
model to both parameter and structural changes.
23. For example, the role of the long lifetime of energy consuming capital
was gauged by varying the potential for retrofits to the enregy
requirements of existing capital. Increasing the retrofit potential
from 25% to 75%, implying existing capital could be brought 75% of the
way from the original eneryg efficiency to the optimal efficiency,
reduced the peak real energy price by 15% and peak real OPEC revenues
by nearly one third. However, the behavior modes exhibited by real
energy price, OPEC revenues, and the other indicators of vulnerability
were unchanged.
24. Resources: based on USGS and other estimates (Tessmer et al. 1977)
Backstop Price: Lovins 1977 touched off a vociferous debate over the
methods and assumptions used in estimating backstop energy costs that
is still raging. See also Lovins and Lovins 1980, especially Chapters
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7 and 8. Rand 1979 documents the problems with cost estimation
procedures.
Elasticity of Substitution and Retrofit Potential: Berndt and Wood 1975
report an Allen partial elasticity of substitution between labor and
energy of .65 while that between capital and energy was found to be
-3.2 See also Berndt and Wood 1977 and 1979 and Hogan and Weyant 1978.
OPEC Pricing Policy: OPEC's most likely long-run pricing strategy is to
gradually raise the price to the costs of alternative or backstop
sources (OPEC 1981). The base case assumes the soft market conditions
of 1981 will continue through 1982 resulting in constant real prices
until 1983.. Between 1983 and 1995, the OPEC price gradually increases
to the price of backstop energy. After 1995, the OPEC price equals
OPEC's expectation of the price of backstop energy.
25..The simulations actually begin in 1900 from a stationary equilibrium.
By 1950, the model settles into a balanced growth path corresponding to
the economy of 1950. The 50-year "startup" period is required because
the transition from stationary equilibrium to growth involves changes
in the age structure of capital and sectoral shifts: relative
expansion of the capital sector, changes in workforce participation,
savings/consumption decisions, etc.
26. Theil 1966, Ch. 2.3-2.5, esp. pp. 29-32.
27. Investment: The model does not include the business cycle and hence
actual investment fluctuates around simulated investment.
Net Energy Use: The model assumes a constant efficiency of energy
production and distribution while actual efficiencies have declined
with growing electrification.
Energy Price: The model does not include differential technological
progress or economies of scale in the energy sector.
28. It is often argued that OPEC ownership of U.S. assets decreases
vulnerability by raising OPEC's stake in the performance and stability
of the U.S. economy. Such a view, however, presumes revenue
maximization (or something similar) dominates OPEC's "objective
function", a view both at odds with history and strongly dependent on
the precarious stability of member country regimes. OPEC ownership of
U.S. assets not only diverts to OPEC income and profit created by U.S.
industry and needed for further economic growth, but allows OPEC
members to develop sustainable sources of income outside their own
countries, both increasing OPEC's latitude for action in the oil market
and in internal economic and political policy.
29. The assumptions of the "conventional backstop" case are the same as
those for the base case of the model as described in chapters 3 and 4
except for the assumption of reduced labor mobility to the conventional
backstop sector.
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